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MD - Spay/neuter - § 2-1602. Spay/Neuter Fund

Summary: This Maryland law establishes a spay/neuter fund to finance local governments and animal welfare organizations for programs to facilitate the spay and neutering of dogs and cats in the state. In addition, as of 2014, each county and organization that receives funding shall quarterly report: (1) the number of cats and dogs taken in; (2) the number of cats and dogs disposed of, broken down by method of disposal, including euthanasia; and (3) any other relevant data the Department requires.

This Maryland law establishes a spay/neuter fund to finance local governments and animal welfare organizations for programs to facilitate the spay and neutering of dogs and cats in the state. In addition, as of 2014, each county and organization that receives funding shall quarterly report: (1) the number of cats and dogs taken in; (2) the number of cats and dogs disposed of, broken down by method of disposal, including euthanasia; and (3) any other relevant data the Department requires.

MD - Service animal - § 9-957. Maryland Veterans Service Animal Program

Summary: This 2017 law establishes the Maryland Veterans Service Animal Program. A purpose of the Program is to refer eligible veterans who inquire about participation in the Program to one or more nonprofit training entities. The Department shall select at least one qualified nonprofit training entity to implement a training protocol that will teach each Program participant methodologies, strategies, and techniques for partnering with service dogs or support dogs. This entity will also help select and facilitate training of service or support dogs. The Maryland Veterans Service Animal Program Fund is also established to fund the Program.

This 2017 law establishes the Maryland Veterans Service Animal Program. A purpose of the Program is to refer eligible veterans who inquire about participation in the Program to one or more nonprofit training entities. The Department shall select at least one qualified nonprofit training entity to implement a training protocol that will teach each Program participant methodologies, strategies, and techniques for partnering with service dogs or support dogs. This entity will also help select and facilitate training of service or support dogs. The Maryland Veterans Service Animal Program Fund is also established to fund the Program.

MD - Vehicles, unattended animals - § 21-1101. Unattended vehicle requirements

Summary: This Maryland law relates to unattended vehicles (i.e., a person must not leave a running motor vehicle unattended). When a cat or dog is left in the unattended vehicle of an on-duty law enforcement officer or an animal control officer, the provisions of that subsection do not apply to the law enforcement officer or the animal control officer.

This Maryland law relates to unattended vehicles (i.e., a person must not leave a running motor vehicle unattended). When a cat or dog is left in the unattended vehicle of an on-duty law enforcement officer or an animal control officer, the provisions of that subsection do not apply to the law enforcement officer or the animal control officer.

CT - Cruelty - § 54-86n. Appointment of advocate in proceeding re the welfare or custody of a cat or dog.

Summary: This 2016 law states that, in a cruelty or welfare proceedings, the court may order, upon its own initiative or upon request of a party or counsel for a party, that a separate advocate be appointed to represent the interests of justice. That advocate can monitor the case and supply the court with information about the welfare of the cat or dog. The Department of Agriculture shall maintain a list of attorneys with knowledge of animal issues and the legal system and a list of law schools that have students, or anticipate having students, with an interest in animal issues and the legal system. Such attorneys and law students shall be eligible to serve on a voluntary basis as advocates under this section.

This 2016 law states that, in a cruelty or welfare proceedings, the court may order, upon its own initiative or upon request of a party or counsel for a party, that a separate advocate be appointed to represent the interests of justice. That advocate can monitor the case and supply the court with information about the welfare of the cat or dog. The Department of Agriculture shall maintain a list of attorneys with knowledge of animal issues and the legal system and a list of law schools that have students, or anticipate having students, with an interest in animal issues and the legal system. Such attorneys and law students shall be eligible to serve on a voluntary basis as advocates under this section.

IN - Spay, neuter - Chapter 4. Spay-Neuter Requirement for Animal Care Facilities

Summary: This Indiana chapter added in 2016 concerns the spay-neuter requirements for animal care facilities. Beginning July 1, 2021, except as provided in this chapter, a companion animal shall be spayed or neutered before adoption from an animal care facility.

This Indiana chapter added in 2016 concerns the spay-neuter requirements for animal care facilities. Beginning July 1, 2021, except as provided in this chapter, a companion animal shall be spayed or neutered before adoption from an animal care facility.

US - Air travel, disability - § 41705. Discrimination against handicapped individuals

Summary: The Air Carrier Access Act (ACAA) was enacted in 1986. The law prohibits discrimination by commercial airlines on the basis of disability. An individual is considered "disabled" if he or she (1) has a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more major life activities.; (2) l has a record of such an impairment; or (3) is regarded as having such an impairment. This law requires that each complaint under this section are investigated and those data reviewed/reported. Regulations promulgated under the ACAA in 2008 set forth requirements for service brought animals aboard commercial flights.

The Air Carrier Access Act (ACAA) was enacted in 1986. The law prohibits discrimination by commercial airlines on the basis of disability. An individual is considered "disabled" if he or she (1) has a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more major life activities.; (2) l has a record of such an impairment; or (3) is regarded as having such an impairment. This law requires that each complaint under this section are investigated and those data reviewed/reported. Regulations promulgated under the ACAA in 2008 set forth requirements for service brought animals aboard commercial flights.

Animal Legal Def. Fund v. Wasden

Summary: In 2012, an animal rights activist went undercover to get a job at an Idaho dairy farm and then secretly filmed ongoing animal abuse there. Mercy for Animals, an animal rights group, publicly released portions of the video, drawing national attention. The dairy farm owner responded to the video by firing the abusive employees who were caught on camera, instituting operational protocols, and conducting an animal welfare audit at the farm. Local law enforcement authorities launched an investigation that culminated in the conviction of one of the employees for animal cruelty. After the video's release, the dairy farm owner and his family received multiple threats. In 2012, an animal rights activist went undercover to get a job at an Idaho dairy farm and then secretly filmed ongoing animal abuse there. Mercy for Animals, an animal rights group, publicly released portions of the video, drawing national attention. The dairy farm owner responded to the video by firing the abusive employees who were caught on camera, instituting operational protocols, and conducting an animal welfare audit at the farm. Local law enforcement authorities launched an investigation that culminated in the conviction of one of the employees for animal cruelty. After the video's release, the dairy farm owner and his family received multiple threats. Animal rights advocacy organization brought action against the Governor and Attorney General of Idaho, challenging statute that criminalized interference with agricultural production facilities as violative of the First Amendment's free speech protections, violative of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, and preempted by federal law. The United States District Court for the District of Idaho entered summary judgment in favor of organization and granted organization's motion to permanently enjoin enforcement of the statute. The court held that 1) Idaho statute criminalizing entry into an agricultural production facility by misrepresentation violated First Amendment; 2) Idaho statute criminalizing obtaining records of an agricultural production facility by misrepresentation did not violate First Amendment; 3) Idaho statute criminalizing obtaining records of an agricultural production facility by misrepresentation did not violate Equal Protection Clause; 4) Idaho statute criminalizing obtaining employment with an agricultural production facility by misrepresentation with the intent to cause economic or other injury to the facility's operations, property, or personnel, did not violate First Amendment; 5) Idaho statute criminalizing obtaining employment with an agricultural production facility by misrepresentation with the intent to cause economic or other injury to the facility's operations, property, or personnel did not violate Equal Protection Clause; and 6) Idaho statute prohibiting a person from entering a private agricultural production facility and, without express consent from the facility owner, making audio or video recordings of the conduct of an agricultural production facility's operations violated First Amendment. Affirmed in part; reversed in part.

In 2012, an animal rights activist went undercover to get a job at an Idaho dairy farm and then secretly filmed ongoing animal abuse there. Mercy for Animals, an animal rights group, publicly released portions of the video, drawing national attention. The dairy farm owner responded to the video by firing the abusive employees who were caught on camera, instituting operational protocols, and conducting an animal welfare audit at the farm. Local law enforcement authorities launched an investigation that culminated in the conviction of one of the employees for animal cruelty. After the video's release, the dairy farm owner and his family received multiple threats. In 2012, an animal rights activist went undercover to get a job at an Idaho dairy farm and then secretly filmed ongoing animal abuse there. Mercy for Animals, an animal rights group, publicly released portions of the video, drawing national attention. The dairy farm owner responded to the video by firing the abusive employees who were caught on camera, instituting operational protocols, and conducting an animal welfare audit at the farm. Local law enforcement authorities launched an investigation that culminated in the conviction of one of the employees for animal cruelty. After the video's release, the dairy farm owner and his family received multiple threats. Animal rights advocacy organization brought action against the Governor and Attorney General of Idaho, challenging statute that criminalized interference with agricultural production facilities as violative of the First Amendment's free speech protections, violative of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, and preempted by federal law. The United States District Court for the District of Idaho entered summary judgment in favor of organization and granted organization's motion to permanently enjoin enforcement of the statute. The court held that 1) Idaho statute criminalizing entry into an agricultural production facility by misrepresentation violated First Amendment; 2) Idaho statute criminalizing obtaining records of an agricultural production facility by misrepresentation did not violate First Amendment; 3) Idaho statute criminalizing obtaining records of an agricultural production facility by misrepresentation did not violate Equal Protection Clause; 4) Idaho statute criminalizing obtaining employment with an agricultural production facility by misrepresentation with the intent to cause economic or other injury to the facility's operations, property, or personnel, did not violate First Amendment; 5) Idaho statute criminalizing obtaining employment with an agricultural production facility by misrepresentation with the intent to cause economic or other injury to the facility's operations, property, or personnel did not violate Equal Protection Clause; and 6) Idaho statute prohibiting a person from entering a private agricultural production facility and, without express consent from the facility owner, making audio or video recordings of the conduct of an agricultural production facility's operations violated First Amendment. Affirmed in part; reversed in part.

DE - Wildlife, groundhog - § 798. Taking of woodchuck or groundhog

Summary: This Delaware laws states that woodchuck or groundhog may be hunted, trapped, caught, shot, killed, sold, shipped or otherwise disposed of, by any person and at any time.

This Delaware laws states that woodchuck or groundhog may be hunted, trapped, caught, shot, killed, sold, shipped or otherwise disposed of, by any person and at any time.

Nonhuman Rights Project, Inc. ex rel. Beulah v. R.W. Commerford & Sons, Inc.

Summary: In this case the petitioner, Nonhuman Rights Project, Inc., sought a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of three elephants, Beulah, Minnie, and Karen, which are owned by the respondents, R.W. Commerford & Sons, Inc. and William R. Commerford, as president of R.W. Commerford & Sons, Inc. The issue was whether the court should grant the petition for writ of habeas corpus because the elephants are “persons” entitled to liberty and equality for the purposes of habeas corpus. The court denied the petition on the ground that the court lacks subject matter jurisdiction (because the plaintiffs lacked standing) and the petition was wholly frivolous on its face in legal terms (elephants are not "persons" according to the court). The court he court dismissed the petition for writ of habeas, but pointed to the state's anti-cruelty laws "as a potential alternative method of ensuring the well-being of any animal."

In this case the petitioner, Nonhuman Rights Project, Inc., sought a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of three elephants, Beulah, Minnie, and Karen, which are owned by the respondents, R.W. Commerford & Sons, Inc. and William R. Commerford, as president of R.W. Commerford & Sons, Inc. The issue was whether the court should grant the petition for writ of habeas corpus because the elephants are “persons” entitled to liberty and equality for the purposes of habeas corpus. The court denied the petition on the ground that the court lacks subject matter jurisdiction (because the plaintiffs lacked standing) and the petition was wholly frivolous on its face in legal terms (elephants are not "persons" according to the court). The court he court dismissed the petition for writ of habeas, but pointed to the state's anti-cruelty laws "as a potential alternative method of ensuring the well-being of any animal."

People for Ethical Treatment of Animals, Inc. v. Miami Seaquarium

Summary: PETA, an animal rights organization, brought this action in July 2015 to enjoin the Miami Seaquarium. The injunction would force the marine park to relinquish possession of a killer whale, Lolita, by releasing her to a sea pen. The grounds for this injunction is an alleged violation of section 9(a)(1)(B) of the Endangered Species Act by the marine park when they confined the killer whale in such conditions that the confinement amounted to a taking of the endangered species of animal. PETA specifically alleged that the marine park took Lolita by harming and harassing her, citing thirteen different injuries that were directly caused by her confinement quarters. When Lolita’s species was recognized as an endangered species by the Act, it specifically excluded captive members of the species. Just two months prior to filing suit, PETA had successfully lobbied to have that exclusion removed from the listing, enabling the suit itself. The district court held for summary judgment in favor of the marine park, saying that to have taken an animal would require a grave threat or potential for a grave threat to the animal’s survival, and PETA did not provide evidence of conduct that met that standard. In this appeal, the court affirms the district court’s summary judgment, but disagrees with their standard for a taking of an animal. After lengthy analysis of the statutory language, this court lowers the standard to posing a threat of serious harm to the animal, rather than death of the animal. However, this court also holds that PETA did not prove that the Seaquarium’s confinement of Lolita met this standard either. Affirmed.

PETA, an animal rights organization, brought this action in July 2015 to enjoin the Miami Seaquarium. The injunction would force the marine park to relinquish possession of a killer whale, Lolita, by releasing her to a sea pen. The grounds for this injunction is an alleged violation of section 9(a)(1)(B) of the Endangered Species Act by the marine park when they confined the killer whale in such conditions that the confinement amounted to a taking of the endangered species of animal. PETA specifically alleged that the marine park took Lolita by harming and harassing her, citing thirteen different injuries that were directly caused by her confinement quarters. When Lolita’s species was recognized as an endangered species by the Act, it specifically excluded captive members of the species. Just two months prior to filing suit, PETA had successfully lobbied to have that exclusion removed from the listing, enabling the suit itself. The district court held for summary judgment in favor of the marine park, saying that to have taken an animal would require a grave threat or potential for a grave threat to the animal’s survival, and PETA did not provide evidence of conduct that met that standard. In this appeal, the court affirms the district court’s summary judgment, but disagrees with their standard for a taking of an animal. After lengthy analysis of the statutory language, this court lowers the standard to posing a threat of serious harm to the animal, rather than death of the animal. However, this court also holds that PETA did not prove that the Seaquarium’s confinement of Lolita met this standard either. Affirmed.
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