United States

Summary: In 2013, Plaintiffs visited Defendants' zoo, the Cherokee Bear Zoo, in North Carolina where they observed four bears advertised as grizzly bears in what appeared to Plaintiffs as substandard conditions. As a result, Plaintiffs filed a citizen suit in federal district court alleging the Zoo's practice of keeping the bears was a taking of a threatened species under the federal Endangered Species Act (ESA). In essence, Plaintiffs contend the Zoo's conduct was a form of harassment under the ESA, and so they sought injunctive relief. After denying the Zoo's motions for summary judgment, the district court held a bench trial where the court ruled against Plaintiffs on the issue of the Zoo's liability under the ESA. The manner in which the bears were kept did not constitute a taking for purposes of the ESA. On appeal to the Fourth Circuit, this Court first found Plaintiffs established Article III standing for an aesthetic injury. Second, the Court agreed with the district court that evidence showed these bears were grizzly bears. While the Defendant-Zoo's veterinarian testified at trial that they are European brown bears, the collective evidence including expert testimony, veterinary records, USDA reports, and the Zoo's own advertising justified the lower court's conclusion that the bears are threatened grizzly bears. As to the unlawful taking under the ESA, the Fourth Circuit vacated the lower court's holding and remanded the case to district court. The legal analysis used by the court was incorrect because the court did not first determine whether the Zoo's practices were "generally accepted" before it applied the exclusion from the definition of harassment. The lower court based its conclusion on the fact that the Zoo met applicable minimum standards under the Animal Welfare Act (AWA) and did not explore whether these standards were "generally accepted." Affirmed in part, vacated and remanded.

Summary: This case dealt with a condo owner and his son who lived in a condo and relied on a service dog for treatment of PTSD. The Plaintiffs filed suit against the condo trust, Board of Trustees, Board members, and others, alleging violation of the Fair Housing Act (FHA) by not allowing the Plaintiffs to keep the dog in their condo unit. The father attempted to communicate with the Trustees about a reasonable accommodation for the service dog, but was met with silence from the Trustees. After the dog had already moved into the condo, the Board sent correspondence stating that fines would be assessed if the dog was not removed after a certain date. After complications with securing the requisite medical info, the dog was ultimately allowed to say, but fines had accrued. The Court held that 1) plaintiffs stated claim that defendants violated FHA; 2) owner was an aggrieved person under the FHA, and thus owner had standing to bring claim; 3) district court would decline to dismiss claim on exhaustion grounds; and 4) under Massachusetts law, claims against attorney and law firm were barred by the litigation privilege. Thus, the court the Court denied the Board and Trust's motion to dismiss and granted Attorney Gaines and the Law Firm's motion to dismiss.

Summary: This Indiana law allows a court to grant ex parte orders for protection in cases of domestic or family violence. Effective July 1, 2017, a court may grant a petitioner the exclusive possession, care, custody, or control of any animal owned, possessed, kept, or cared for by the petitioner, respondent, minor child of either the petitioner or respondent, or any other family or household member. Additionally, the court may prohibit a respondent from removing, transferring, injuring, concealing, harming, attacking, mistreating, threatening to harm, or otherwise disposing of an animal described in subdivision (5).

Summary: This provides a brief overview of the commercial breeding industry in the United States.

Summary: This subsection covers the importation of dogs into the United States. No person shall import a live dog from any part of the world into the continental United States or Hawaii for purposes of resale, research, or veterinary treatment unless the dog is accompanied by an import permit issued by APHIS and is imported into the continental United States or Hawaii within 30 days after the proposed date of arrival stated in the import permit. Health and rabies certificates are required as provided.

Summary: SUMMARY: We are revising the definition of retail pet store and related regulations in order to ensure that the definition of retail pet store in the regulations is consistent with the Animal Welfare Act (AWA), thereby bringing more pet animals sold at retail under the protection of the AWA. Specifically, we are narrowing the definition of retail pet store to mean a place of business or residence at which the seller, buyer, and the animal available for sale are physically present so that every buyer may personally observe the animal prior to purchasing and/or taking custody of that animal after purchase, and where only certain animals are sold or offered for sale, at retail, for use as pets. Retail pet stores are not required to be licensed and inspected under the AWA. In addition, we are removing the limitation on the source of gross income from the licensing exemption in the regulations for any person who does not sell or negotiate the sale of any wild or exotic animal, dog, or cat and who derives no more than $500 gross income from the sale of the animals other than wild or exotic animals, dogs, or cats during any calendar year. We are also increasing from three to four the number of breeding female dogs, cats, and/or small exotic or wild mammals that a person may maintain on his or her premises and be exempt from the licensing and inspection requirements if he or she sells only the offspring of those animals born and raised on his or her premises, for pets or exhibition. This exemption applies regardless of whether those animals are sold at retail or wholesale. These actions are necessary so that all animals sold at retail for use as pets are monitored for their health and humane treatment.

Summary: This paper gives an overview of the commercial breeding industry in the United States, beginning with a discussion of the industry’s various market forms, including brick and mortar pet stores, Internet websites, and foreign breeders. The paper then examines the underlying federal law and administrative regulations that provide minimum care standards for certain breeders. What follows is information on various state laws and recent legislation, including an examination of the increasing prevalence of local laws that address the puppy mill industry. The paper then explains the enforcement of puppy mill laws, which is criticized as insufficient to address the problem, and concludes with the observation that local laws and consumer education appear to be the most feasible solutions to combatting the prevalence of commercial breeding.

Summary: [Derived from Commissioner of Agriculture statement] The purpose of these rules is to define the administration and enforcement of the Pet Animal Care and Facilities Act, § 35-80-101 through 117, C.R.S., (“PACFA”). The rule includes minimum standards of physical facility, sanitation, ventilation, heating, cooling, humidity, spatial and enclosure requirements, nutrition, humane care, medical treatment, sterilization of dogs and cats released to prospective owners from animal shelters and pet animal rescues, and method of operation, including the minimum holding period for and disposition stray or abandoned pet animals, that are, in the opinion of the Commissioner, necessary to carry out the provisions of this article; the minimum weight requirement for the transfer of cats; maintenance of records concerning health care, euthanasia, and transactions involving pet animals; the establishment of qualifications for any applicant and standards of practice for any of the licenses authorized under this article, including the establishment of classifications and sub-classifications for any license authorized pursuant to PACFA; the issuance and reinstatement of any license authorized by PACFA and the grounds for any disciplinary actions authorized by PACFA, including letters of admonition or the denial, restriction, suspension, or revocation of any license authorized by PACFA; the amount of any license fee for a pet animal facility license; and the annual date on which licenses and psittacine bird leg bands issued pursuant to PACFA expire.

Summary: This chapter concerns ownership of ferrets in Michigan. A person shall not own or harbor a ferret over 12 weeks of age unless the ferret has a current vaccination against rabies with an approved rabies vaccine. A person may engage in hobby breeding of ferrets provided all requirements are met under Section 287.893. A person shall not release a ferret into the wild or abandon a ferret.

Summary: This case deals with the constitutionality of Utah's "ag gag" law, enacted in 2012. The law criminalizes lying to obtain access to an agricultural operation and the subsequent recording or filming once inside. According to statements made enactment, it is directed at undercover operations that investigate farm animal abuse. Plaintiffs assert that the law violates their First Amendment rights. On review of motions, the court first looked at whether the First Amendment applies to this type of "lying." Because a recent U.S. Supreme Court case makes lying that causes "cognizable legal harm" outside the protection of the First Amendment, the court examined the type of lying at issue in the Utah law. Ultimately, the court found that lying to gain access to these agricultural facilities does not in itself cause a legally cognizable harm. Thus, "absent an additional showing of harm, under either interpretation, at least some of the lies criminalized by the Act retain First Amendment protection." With regard to First Amendment protections for the act of recording once at an agricultural operation and whether a strict scrutiny standard applies, the court looked to other circuits that found the act of making speech (i.e., recording/filming) is protected. The State countered with the fact that such recording occurs on private property, but the court found the government cannot place criminal restrictions on speech simply because it occurs on private property. The court noted that the property owner can indeed remove the person from the property and sue for any damages resulting from the trespass, which is different than prosecution by the state to curtail speech. Finally, after finding that the act impinges protected speech, the court then analyzed whether it withstood a strict scrutiny review. The State proffered government interests that include concerns over worker protection and disease outbreak. However, the court noted nothing in the legislative history on these claims or any actual incidents that supported these asserted government interests. The court found the Act did not survive strict scrutiny as it was not narrowly tailored and instead was directed at the content of the speech (the act of recording a facility). The Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment was granted and the State's Motion for Summary Judgment was denied.