United States

Summary: This Pennsylvania law states that public or nonpublic school pupils from kindergarten through grade twelve may refuse to dissect, vivisect, incubate, capture or otherwise harm or destroy animals or any parts thereof as part of their course of instruction. Schools must notify pupils and their parents/guardians of the right to decline participation. A pupil who chooses to refrain from participation or observation shall be offered an alternative education project. No pupil shall be discriminated against based on his or her decision to exercise rights under this law.

Summary: This comprises Illinois' Dissection Alternatives Act. The act requires the State Board of Education to make guidelines that give notice to parents and students on which courses ordinarily involve dissection of animals and whether or not alternative projects for learning are available. A school may excuse a student enrolled in a course in which students are ordinarily expected to perform, participate in, or observe dissection who objects for any reason to performing, participating in, or observing that dissection and instead allow the student to complete an alternative project. The act defines "student" as those pupils at a public or private elementary or secondary school in Illinois. No student is to be penalized or discriminated against for refusing to perform, participate in, or observe dissection.

Summary: This California chapter of laws concerns students refraining from engaging in animal dissection in education institutions. Under Section 32255.1, any pupil (defined as under age 18) with a moral objection to dissecting or otherwise harming or destroying animals, or any parts thereof, shall notify his or her teacher regarding this objection. If the pupil refrains from such participation, he or she and the teacher may work to develop an alternate education project. The pupil shall not be discriminated against based upon his or her decision to exercise his or her rights pursuant to this chapter. A pupil's objection to participating in an educational project pursuant to this section shall be substantiated by a note from his or her parent or guardian.

Summary: This Georgia involves an interlocutory appeal arising from a dog bite lawsuit. In 2016, Plaintiff Saulsbury was walking her English Bulldog past Defendant Wilson's house when Wilson's pitbull dog escaped its crate in the open garage. A fight ensued between the dogs. Wilson then attempted to break up the fight and was allegedly bitten by Saulsbury's dog, suffering a broken arm in the process and necessitating a course of rabies shots. The Saulsburys then sued the Wilsons in magistrate court to recover hospital and veterinary expenses. Wilson counterclaimed for her injuries in excess $15,000, thus transferring the case to superior court. At this time, the Saulsburys moved for summary judgment, which the trial court denied. The Court of Appeals here reverses that denial. The court found that Wilson assumed the risk when she intervened in a dog fight with her bare hands. In particular, the court observed that assumption of risk serves as a complete defense to negligence. That finding was bolstered by the fact that Wilson had knowledge that her dog had previously bitten other persons and had admitted to breaking up previous dog fights with a stick. The court relied on previous case law showing that all animals, even domesticated animals, pose a risk as does the act of breaking up even human fights. The court was not persuaded by the fact that Saulsbury may have been in violation of various DeKalb County ordinances related to an owner's responsibility to control his or her animal. A plain reading of those ordinances does not impose a duty on the part of an owner to "dangerously insert herself into a dog fight." The court found the lower court erred in denying the Saulsbury's motion for summary judgment and reversed and remanded the case.

Summary: In this California case, the plaintiffs sued to challenge the validity of the County of Monterey rooster-keeping ordinance, seeking a declaratory judgment that the law is unconstitutional. The ordinance limits residents to no more than four roosters on a single property without a rooster keeping permit and also describes care and keeping requirements. The trial court found that the ordinance did not violate the constitution and entered judgment for the City. Plaintiffs here appeal that decision, arguing that the ordinance: (1) takes property without compensation in violation of the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution; (2) infringes on Congress’ authority to regulate interstate commerce; (3) violates the Equal Protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution; (4) is a prohibited bill of attainder; and (5) violates the rights to privacy and to possess property guaranteed by the California Constitution. With respect to the Fifth Amendment taking challenge, the court found that the regulatory takings argument failed because there is no evidence that the ordinance affected plaintiffs or that they even applied for or were eligible for a permit. As to the interstate commerce challenge, plaintiffs provided no evidence that the ordinance would cause excess roosters to be divested from owners and sold in commerce to support this claim. As to Equal Protection, the plaintiffs correctly assert that the ordinance treats people differently based on age (i.e., students engaged in 4-H or FFA activities are exempted from the four-rooster limitation). However, the court found that the county stated a legitimate objective of public health and safety and this differential treatment of a non-suspect class advances that interest. Finally, the court found the ordinance was not a bill of attainder since it prospectively regulates roosters and also that it does not violate California's right to privacy and property possession. Indeed, the court found that plaintiff did not identify a specific privacy interest implicated by the ordinance. Thus, the judgment was affirmed.

Summary: This act legalizes and only applies to pari-mutuel wagering on dog and horse races in the state of Iowa. The act creates a state racing and gaming commission which has full jurisdiction to investigate applicants, adopt standards, and regulate all horse and dog races governed by the act. Organizations that wish to conduct horse and dog racing must apply to the commission for a license and meet the requirements. Tracks that are licensed to race dogs are required to maintain a racing dog adoption program.

Summary: This statute controls the taking of foxes and the various acceptable methods for doing so. Foxes may be taken with dogs year-round. Foxes are only allowed to be taken by a firearm under certain exceptions and they are not allowed to be taken by any electronic calling device. The statute further states that the Wildlife Resources Commission is directed to study foxes and fur-bearer populations and that subject to the findings from those studies the Commission may open a season if it finds that fox populations in a particular area are adequate to support a harvesting of that population. Lawful methods for taking game animals apply to taking foxes when an open season is declared. The Commission must implement a system of tagging foxes and fox furs with a special tag. No foxes or furs may be sold without a tag. The Commission is also authorized to declare a closed season if it finds that hunting foxes with dogs causes a harmful affect on turkey restoration projects. The Commission also has the authority to establish reasonable population control measures if a contagious animal disease is found in a local fox population.

Summary: This statute allows for a retired service animal to be transferred to an officer or employee who had custody of the animal during the animal's public service, a surviving spouse or surviving children of a deceased officer or employee who had custody of the animal during its service, or an organization dedicated to assisting retired service animals.

Summary: This Oregon law provides that the owner of a search and rescue animal or a therapy animal may bring an action for economic and noneconomic damages against any person who steals or, without provocation, attacks the search and rescue animal or therapy animal. The owner may also bring an action for such damages against the owner of any animal that, without provocation, attacks a search and rescue animal or therapy animal. If the animal dies as a result of the injuries sustained or the incident prevents the animal from returning to service, the measure of economic damages shall include, but need not be limited to, the replacement value of an equally trained animal, without any differentiation for the age or the experience of the animal. If the animal recovers and returns to service, the measure of economic damages shall include, but need not be limited to, the costs of temporary replacement services, veterinary medical expenses and any other costs and expenses incurred by the owner as a result of the theft of or injury to the animal.