United States

In this case, the Animal Legal Defense Fund (ALDF) sought to intervene on a proceeding dealing with the United States Department of Agriculture (USDA) and a family owned-zoo in Iowa for alleged violations of the Animal Welfare Act. The USDA was seeking enforcement of the Animal Welfare Act against the Iowa zoo and the ALDF sought to intervene because it has long criticized the zoo's care and handling of its animals. The ALDF was prevented from intervening by the administrative law judge (ALJ) that was presiding over the matter. The ALJ did not allow the ALDF to intervene in the matter on the basis that the “ALDF’s stated interests were beyond the scope of the proceeding.” The ALDF filed suit challenging this decision according to Section 555(b) of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), which allows “interested persons” to participate in agency proceedings “so far as the orderly conduct of the public business permits.” The court found that the ALDF should have been allowed to intervene in the proceeding according to 555(b) because the ALDF’s "demonstrated interest in the welfare of the zoo's animals falls squarely within the scope of the USDA enforcement proceeding.” The court also found that there was no evidence to suggest that having ALDF intervene would "impede the orderly conduct of the public business permits.” As a result, the court held in favor of the ALDF’s motion for summary judgment and remanded the case back the case back to USDA for further consideration of ALDF's motion to Intervene. 

Friends of Animals, an animal welfare organization, filed suit for a preliminary injunction against the Bureau of Land Management (BLM). Friends of Animals filed suit after the BLM started organizing a new “gather” which is a a term used for the removal of wild horses. The BLM planned to “gather” wild horses from a range in Utah and the Friends of Animals challenged the decision on three grounds: (1) the decision to gather was not grounded on any National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) document such as a environmental assessment (EA); the BLM failed to honor its previous commitment to include new EAs for any new gathers; and (3) the gather violates the Wild Horses Act on the basis that the BLM failed to make a excess population determination before authorizing the gather.

The court reviewed the three claims separately and determined that Friends of Animals’ challenges to the gather were not likely to succeed and there was not a sufficient irreparable harm to warrant a preliminary injunction. First, the court found that under NEPA, an agency is able to rely on a previous EA so long as “new circumstances, new information or changes in the action or its impacts not previously analyzed [do not] result in significantly different environmental effects.” The court found that previous EAs were sufficient because they had assessed an “essentially similar” capture method. Additionally, the court determined that although BLM had previously agreed to provide new EAs for any new gathers, the BLM was not legally required to do, so the Friends of Animals argument regarding this issue would not succeed. Lastly, the court found that the BLM had not violated the Wild Horses Act because the BLM had in fact conducted an excess population determination.

Lastly, the court analyzed whether or not the gather created an irreparable harm that would warrant a preliminary injunction. The court found that there was not sufficient evidence to prove any irreparable harm. As a result, the court denied the preliminary injunction and held in favor of the BLM.

Plaintiff, American Bird Conservancy, is a non-profit organization that was dedicated to the conservation of the Piping Plover (a threatened species) in this case. The individual Plaintiffs, David A. Krauss and Susan Scioli were also members of the organization, who observed Piping Plovers at Jones Beach, in New York State for many years. The Plaintiffs brought an action against Defendant Rose Harvey, the Commissioner of the New York State “Parks Office”. The Plaintiffs asserted that the Commissioner failed to act while members of the public routinely fed, built shelters, and cared for the feral cats on Jones Beach. As the cat colonies flourished, the Piping Plover population decreased due to attacks by the cats. The Plaintiffs contended that by failing to take measures to decrease the feral cat population, the Commissioner was allowing the cats to prey on the Piping Plover, in violation of the federal Endangered Species Act (ESA). The Commissioner moved to dismiss the complaint. The District Court, held that: (1) the affidavit and documentary evidence provided by the Alley Cat Allies (ACA) organization was outside the scope of permissible supporting materials for the motion to dismiss. (2)The Plaintiffs had standing to bring action alleging violation of the Endangered Species Act. The Commissioners motion to dismiss was denied.

In this case, Michael A. Baker appealed the trial court’s decision regarding property distribution and visitation rights with regard to his two dogs, Grace and Roxy, following his divorce from Kimberly K. Enders. The trial court awarded custody of both dogs to Enders and denied Baker any visitation rights. In making its decision, the trial court relied on a New York case in which the New York Supreme Court did not allow dog visitation. (Travis v. Murray, 42 Misc.3d 447, 977 N.Y.S.2d 621, 631 (N.Y.Sup.Ct.2013). The New York Supreme Court refused to apply the “best interests of the dog” standard and instead applied a “best for all standard,” holding that “household pets enjoy a status greater than mere chattel.” Baker appealed the trail court’s decision arguing that Illinois courts have the authority to order pet visitation. On appeal, the court determined that there was no case law to suggest that an Illinois court had ever addressed the issue of dog visitation. As a result, the court found that the trial court was well within its discretion to apply the standard used in the New York case. Additionally, the court of appeals applied the statutory definition of “dog owner” in Illinois and determined that Enders was the dogs’ rightful owner. The Illinois statute defined owner as “any person having a right of property in an animal, or who keeps or harbors an animal, or who has it in his care, or acts as its custodian.” The court found that because the dogs were left in Ender’s care following the divorce, she is the one who “keeps or harbors” the dogs and is therefore the owner. Ultimately, the court affirmed the trial court’s decision and denied Baker visitation rights.

EMERGENCY SUPPORT FUNCTION #6 – MASS CARE ANNEX

Emergency Assistance: Coordination of voluntary organizations and unsolicited donations and management of unaffiliated volunteers; essential community relief services; non-congregate and transitional sheltering; support to individuals with disabilities and others with access and functional needs in congregate facilities; support to children in disasters; support to mass evacuations; and support for the rescue, transportation, care, shelter, and essential needs of household pets and service animals.

(ESF 6-2)

In 2014, California added amendments to its law on "Live Animals" in the Retail Food Code related to pet dogs in outdoor dining areas. If a food establishment owner allows it, patrons may bring their pet dogs to an outdoor dining area if requirements are met. Like other states, there must be an outdoor entrance, employees must wash hands if they touch the dogs, dogs must be leashed and under control, pet waste must be properly dealt with, and "food and water provided to pet dogs shall only be in single-use disposable containers." This last provision is interesting because it considers the needs of the canine customers.

Rhode Island has the newest law. In July of 2016, a law enabling restaurant owners to allow a patron's dog to accompany the patron in the outdoor dining area during the hours designated by the owner of the restaurant became effective. The law is very similar to Maryland's by giving the restaurateur the ability to regulate the size and type of dog entering the area. The owner may also deny entry to the restaurant and can eject any patron accompanied by a dog at his or her own discretion. Signage explaining the policy and rules must be visibly posted.

Florida was one of the first states to enact a law on dogs in restaurants in 2006. The law allows a local unit of government to adopt an ordinance that acts as an exemption to the state's Food and Drug Administration Food Code. Once the local exemption is passed, a restaurant can apply for a permit to allow dogs in the outdoor dining spaces. Certain things must be included in the ordinance such as a requirement that staff wash after touching pets, a rule that patrons keep dogs on leashes and under control, a prohibition against dogs on chairs, tables, or other furnishings, signs that list the rules for employees and patrons, and a clean-up station in the outdoor dining area. There are also reporting requirements by the local governments to the State of Florida under the law. The city or county must also have a system in place to document and respond to complaints.

This FAQ explores what states have laws concerning dogs in outdoor dining area of restaurants. About nine states have laws that allow patrons to bring pet dogs to outdoor dining spaces in restaurants. Some laws require that the local unit of government first enact an ordinance allowing the activity.

This set of Colorado laws (effective June of 2016) creates a pilot program for veterans to train their own service dogs. The program identifies a group of up to 10 veterans to pair with dogs. Qualified canine trainers will work with the veterans to use train the dogs for use as service dogs. The program will further offer those veterans who graduate from the program with a trained dog the opportunity and necessary follow-along services to expand the program, if willing, by identifying, fostering, and training a subsequent dog for another eligible veteran who is unable to complete one or more parts of the process due to physical limitations. Other sections of the article explain the criteria for selecting the non-profit agencies for implementation and the creation of a fund in the state treasury.