United States

Summary: In this case, plaintiffs sued defendant, Officer Bethards, for unlawfully killing their pet dog Majka. Plaintiffs' dogs were lying in plaintiffs' unfenced front yard when the officers entered the yard and then followed the dogs to the back of the house, eventually killing one of the dogs. The plaintiffs argued that by unlawfully killing their dog, Officer Bethards violated their constitutional rights under the Fourth Amendment by entering the property without a warrant with the intention of killing the dogs. Officer Bethards moved to have the complaint dismissed for a failure to state a claim and the court denied this motion. Specifically, Officer Bethards argued that this was not a violation of the Fourth Amendment because the Fourth Amendment only applies to “effects,” which does not include dogs. The court disagreed, finding that Fourth Amendment protection for pet dogs is a clearly established right. Ultimately, the court held that the plaintiffs asserted facts sufficient to show a violation of their clearly established Fourth Amendment rights and the district court's order denying Deputy Bethards's motion to dismiss was affirmed.

Summary: Defendant Jonas Smith was convicted of aggravated assault and appealed. He argued that the trial court (1) erred by denying his motion to suppress his warrantless arrest; (2) abused its discretion by failing to grant a mistrial after the Plaintiff referenced the Defendant’s previous incarceration; and (3) abused its discretion by allowing a child witness to testify with the assistance of a service dog. The Court of Appeal of Texas, Houston (14th Dist.)., held that: 1. The police officer had probable cause to believe that the defendant committed an act of family violence, which justified his warrantless arrest; 2. any prejudice resulting from the Plaintiff’s reference to Defendant's prior incarceration was cured by prompt jury instruction to disregard reference; 3. allowing the child witness to testify with the assistance of a service dog was not likely to prejudice the jury in evaluating the child's testimony; and 4.any error in allowing the witness to testify with the assistance of a service dog was harmless. The Court of Appeals reasoned that the defendant did not present any argument during the trial about the jury being prejudiced by the presence of the service dog. Therefore, there was nothing present for review at the appellate level. Also, the Defendant did not identify any harm from the use of a service dog. The Defendant’s conviction was affirmed.

Summary: This case involves challenges to the courtroom procedure of allowing a witness to be accompanied on the witness stand by a support animal. Defendant Johnson appealed his convictions of criminal sexual assault after he was convicted of assaulting his six-year-old niece. During Defendant's trial, a black Labrador retriever was permitted, to accompany the six-year-old victim to the witness stand. On appeal, the Defendant first argued that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to the use of a support animal because MCL 600.2163a(4) only allows a support person. The Court of Appeals of Michigan stated that the trial court had the inherent authority to utilize support animals. Secondly, the Defendant argued that trial counsel should have objected to the notice of a support person on the basis that allowing the witnesses to testify accompanied by the support animal violated his constitutional right to due process. The Court of Appeals stated that there is no indication that the support dog used was visible to the jury, or that he barked, growled, or otherwise interrupted the proceedings. Therefore, the objection was meritless. Next, the Defendant argued that his counsel was ineffective for failing to request various procedural protections if the support animal was used. The Court of Appeals stated that the use of a support dog did not implicate the Confrontation Clause; the presence of the dog did not affect the witnesses' competency to testify or affect the oath given to the witnesses; the witnesses were still subject to cross-examination; and the trier of fact was still afforded the unfettered opportunity to observe the witnesses' demeanor. Finally, the Defendant argued that a limiting instruction should have been provided to the jury when the support animal was utilized and this rendered his counsel ineffective. The Court of Appeals stated, that there are no Michigan jury instructions addressing the use of a support animal. Counsel was then not ineffective in failing to ask for an instruction that does not yet exist in Michigan. The Court of Appeals affirmed the defendant's convictions and sentence and remanded.

Summary: Abstract: Survival of the animal welfare paradigm (as contrasted with a rights-based paradigm creating legal standing for at least some animals) depends on keeping pace with appropriate societal evolution favoring stronger protections for animals. Although evolution of animal welfare protection will take many forms, this Article specifically addresses models for evolving conceptualizations of animals’ property status within the context of animal welfare. For example, in 2015 France amended its Civil Code to change its description of companion animals and some other animals from movable property to “living beings gifted with sensitivity,” while maintaining their status as property. This Article will evaluate various possible approaches courts and legislatures might adopt to highlight the distinctiveness of animals’ property status as compared to inanimate property. Although risks are inherent, finding thoughtful ways to improve or elaborate on some of our courts’ and legislatures’ animals-as-property characterizations may encourage more appropriate protections where needed under the welfare paradigm, and may help blunt arguments that animals are “mere things” under the welfare paradigm. Animals capable of pain or distress are significantly different than ordinary personal property, and more vigorously emphasizing their distinctiveness as a subset of personal property would further both animal welfare and human interests.

Summary: This Nevada statute limits the liability of equine sponsors and professionals, veterinarians, or any other person, for an injury to or death of a participant as a result of an inherent risk of equine activity. The statute also provides the duties that equine activity participants must complete. Finally, the statute provides the exceptions for when a person is not immune from civil liability under the statute and the definition of terms used within the statute.

Summary: This chapter of Michigan laws deals with animals running at large. In Michigan, an owner cannot allow an animal (defined here as cattle, horses, sheep, swine, mules, burros, or goats) to run at large. In addition, a person that is not the owner of the animal cannot willfully and knowingly allow the animal to run at large. Any person who allows an animal to run at large will be guilty of a misdemeanor. Law enforcement is authorized to take possession of any animal that is running at large. Once the animal is in possession of law enforcement, the owner of the animal must be notified or a notice must be placed in the newspaper within 30 days.

Summary: This chapter of Michigan laws deals with the removal, capture, or destruction of gray wolves. According to the laws, a landowner is able to use any means necessary to remove a gray wolf from its property, including lethal force, if the gray wolf is threatening the landowners livestock or dog(s). Once a landowner has removed, captured, or destroyed a gray wolf, the landowner must report it to a department official no later than 12 hours after the removal, capture, or destruction. According to Section 324.95167, the act is not operative until final appellate court issues a decision overruling the decision of The Humane Society of the United States v Dirk Kempthorne that allows removal of wolves from the federal ESA list, or the U.S. Fish & Wildlife Service promulgates a final rule dated after March 12, 2007 that removes gray wolves located in this state from the list of endangered and threatened wildlife established under the federal endangered species act of 1973 and that final rule takes effect.

Summary: This Michigan statute makes a person liable and guilty of a misdemeanor if any animal on the person's property is exposed to or consumes a known poisonous substance. The statute makes an exception for poisons that are mixed only with vegetables or poisons for the destruction of predatory or dangerous prowling animals.

Summary: This Michigan statute makes it a misdemeanor for an individual to knowingly sell any horse or dog meat unless it is plainly labelled.