Connecticut

Summary: These Connecticut statutes require state employees who work with children and families to also report suspected animal harm, neglect, or cruelty. The statutes explain how the reporting should be completed and describes the implementation of training programs for employees to recognize animal abuse. The statutes also discuss the development of an annual report on acutal or suspected instances of animal neglect or cruelty within the state.  

Summary: The Plaintiff, Kim Miller, argued “a severe deprivation” of her rights when the Superior Court dismissed her appeal to prevent her dogs from being euthanized. Miller owned two Rottweiler dogs that attacked the victim Cynthia Reed, causing injuries to Reed's head, the back of her neck, and her back. An animal control officer issued two disposal orders to euthanize Miller’s dogs. The Defendant, Connecticut Department of Agriculture, then affirmed the orders and Miller appealed. The Superior Court also dismissed the appeal, and Miller appealed further to the Appellate Court of Connecticut. Here, Miller argues, among other things, that her Sixth Amendment rights to confront witnesses were violated when witnesses were not available for cross-examination. Plaintiff Miller also claims that there were procedural violations in the initial hearing because of lack of written rules that applied to dog disposal orders and claimed error when the hearing officer acted acted arbitrarily and capriciously by “interject[ing] his opinion” while questioning a witness. The Appellate Court held that: (1) the Uniform Administrative Procedures Act (UAPA) did not preclude the admission of statements from the victim and an eyewitness, even though the victim and witness did not testify at the hearing. The court reasoned that in administrative proceedings under the UAPA, evidence is not inadmissible solely because it constitutes hearsay, as long as the evidence is reliable and probative. Additionally, a party to an administrative proceeding under the UAPA is not required to call any particular witness. (2) A dog owner's appeal of disposal orders for a biting animal is not a criminal prosecution that invokes Sixth Amendment protections. The court reasoned that the issuance of a disposal order does not, by itself, trigger the imposition of a fine or prison term on the owner. Rather, by obviating the threat that dangerous animals pose to the public, the provision is remedial and civil in nature. The judgment of the trial court dismissing the plaintiff's appeal was affirmed.

Summary: Devon D. was convicted of four counts sexual assault and three counts of risk of injury to a child upon allegations made by three of Devon D.’s biological children, C1, C2, and C3. He appealed his conviction on the grounds that the trial court had abused its discretion by having the three cases to be tried jointly and by permitting C1 to testify with a dog at her feet. The appellate court had accepted these arguments and reversed and remanded for a new trial, but the Supreme Court of Connecticut reversed the appellate court. The Connecticut Supreme Court concluded that “the trial court properly exercised its discretion in permitting the cases to be tried together because the evidence in all three cases was cross admissible,” and reversed on that issue. As to the appellate court’s determination that the trial court had abused its discretion in permitting a dog to sit near C1 during her testimony to provide comfort and support,” the Supreme Court also reversed, reinstating the verdict and judgment of the trial court.

Summary: Defendant, the director of the Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals of Connecticut, Inc., was charged with 63 counts of animal cruelty for failing to give animals “proper care by exposing [them] to conditions that placed [them] at risk of hypothermia, dehydration, or to conditions injurious to [their] well-being....” Defendant was the director of a nonprofit animal rescue organization and housed rescued dogs in an uninsulated outdoor barn heated solely by space heaters. After a trial, Defendant was convicted of 15 counts and acquitted of the remaining 48 counts of animal cruelty. On appeal, the defendant claimed that (1) there was insufficient evidence to support the conviction and (2)C.G.S.A. § 53-247(a) was unconstitutionally vague as applied to the facts of this case. The appellate court rejected defendant’s claims and affirmed the trial court’s decision.

Summary: This Connecticut law provides that when a special agreement has been made between the owner of any animals and a person keeping/taking care of such animals for a price, those animals are subject to a lien in favor of the person keeping the animals. The person keeping those animals may detain the animals until the debt is paid. If the debt is not paid with 30 days after it becomes due, the keeper may sell the animals at public auction after he or she gives written notice to the owner of the time and place at least six days before the sale. Additionally, a commercial boarding kennel or veterinary hospital may transfer abandoned animals to a nonprofit animal rescue or adoption organization. An animal is considered abandoned if the owner or keeper of such animal fails to retrieve the animal within five days of the date on which such owner or keeper was scheduled to retrieve the animal. Written notice notice sent certified, return-receipt requested must first be sent to the owner with a ten-day waiting period before the transfer can occur.

Summary: This Connecticut statute allows municipalities to prohibit dogs running at large and to prevet animal cruelty; this statute also prohibts municipalities from adopting breed specific legislation.

Summary: This Connecticut law makes it unlawful to carry any equine in an unnecessarily cruel or inhumane manner, or in a way and manner which might endanger the equine or knowingly and wilfully authorizes or permits such equine to be subjected to unnecessary torture, suffering or cruelty of any kind. Violation results in a fine of not less than one hundred dollars or more than five hundred dollars. [Also see the administrative regulations at https://www.animallaw.info/administrative/connecticut-equines-transportation-equines].

Summary: Under Section 26-40a of Connecticut’s Fisheries and Game Law, gorillas, chimpanzees, bonobos, and orangutans are classified as “potentially dangerous animals” which may not be possessed by the general public. All federally licensed or registered exhibitors and research facilities are exempt from the ban; however, the Connecticut Department of Environmental Protection (DEP) prohibits the importation of potentially dangerous apes by many exhibitors (except zoos, nature centers, and municipal parks).The following discussion begins with a general overview of the various state statutes and regulations affecting Great Apes. It then analyzes the applicability of those laws to the possession and use of apes for specific purposes, including their possession as pets, for scientific research, for commercial purposes, and in sanctuaries.

Summary: Plaintiffs seized approximately 65 dogs from the Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals of Connecticut pursuant to a search and seizure warrant that had been issued on facts showing that the dogs, which were being kept in an uninsulated barn with an average temperature of 30 degrees Fahrenheit, were neglected, in violation of General Statutes § 22–329a. The trial court found that the smaller breed dogs were neglected, but found that larger breed dogs were not. On an appeal by plaintiffs and a cross appeal by defendants, the appeals court found: (1) the trial court applied the correct legal standards and properly determined that the smaller breed dogs were neglected and that the larger breed dogs were not neglected, even though all dogs were kept in a barn with an average temperature of 30 degrees Fahrenheit; (2) § 22–329a was not unconstitutionally vague because a person of ordinary intelligence would know that keeping smaller breed dogs in an uninsulated space with an interior temperature of approximately 30 degrees Fahrenheit would constitute neglect; (3) the trial court did not err in declining to admit the rebuttal testimony offered by the defendants; and (4) the trial court did not err in granting the plaintiffs' request for injunctive relief and properly transferred ownership of the smaller breed dogs to the town. The appellate court, however, reversed the judgment of the trial court only with respect to its dispositional order, which directed the parties to determine among themselves which dogs were smaller breed dogs and which dogs were larger breed dogs, and remanded the case for further proceedings, consistent with this opinion.