Federal

Summary: The state of New Mexico challenged the constitutionality of the Wild Free-Roaming Horses and Burros Act after they were ordered by the U.S. government to recover several wild horses they had rounded up from public lands within their state and sold at auction in violation of the WFRHBA.  The Supreme Court upheld the Act, finding it to be a valid exercise of federal power under the Article IV Property Clause of, which gave Congress the power to protect wildlife on state lands, state law notwithstanding. 

Summary: The court was presented with the question of whether the district court erred in issuing a preliminary injunction prohibiting the implementation of a regulation of the United States Department of Agriculture ("USDA") permitting the resumption of the importation of Canadian cattle into the United States.  The court concluded that it did and therefore reversed the district court. 

Summary: The Washington Department of Game and the Department of Fisheries brought action for declaratory judgment that members of the Puyallup Indian tribe were not exempt from application of state fishery conservation measures.  The Supreme Court held that commercial net fishing by Puyallup Indians, for which the Indians have treaty protection, Puyallup Tribe v. Dept. of Game, 391 U.S. 392, 88 S.Ct. 1725, 20 L.Ed.2d 689, forecloses the bar against net fishing of steelhead trout imposed by Washington State Game Department's regulation, which discriminates against the Puyallups, and as long as steelhead fishing is permitted, the regulation must achieve an accommodation between the Puyallups' net-fishing rights and the rights of sports fishermen.

Summary: The State of New Mexico filed an suit to prevent the U.S. Secretary of the Interior from killing deer in the Carlsbad Caverns National Park that were overbrowsing vegetation and posing a threat to the park's ecology without first having obtained the necessary state permit.  The Court held that the Secretary has the authority to kill the deer to protect the park property, and it is immaterial that the United States does not have exclusive jurisdiction over the lands within Carlsbad Caverns National Park as it has constitutional authority in the form of supervisory powers to manage national parks.  To New Mexico and the other states involved in an amicus capacity in the suit, the real concern was over the federal encroachment into state management of fish and game, particularly in those states where much of the land is under federal control.

Summary: The Natural Resources Defense Council sought material from the National Marine Fisheries Service about an incident of mass stranding of whales under the Freedom of Information Act because the Council thought it had to do with navy sonar use. The Service did not want to release the materials, saying they were protected from disclosure because they were discussions of agency decision-making. The court required disclosure of most of the materials because purely factual matters are not protected from disclosure.

Summary: A customer brought an action against Lowe's home improvement store to recover for injury sustained when a "wild bird" flew into the back of her head while she was shopping in the gardening area.  The plaintiff argued that the defendant did not exercise reasonable care in making the premises safe and that the defendant did not warn customers that the birds were a dangerous condition on the premises.  In granting the owner's motion for summary judgment, the court held that the store owner did not owe customer a duty under Illinois law to protect her from wild bird attack since attack was not reasonably foreseeable.  Further, the store owner was not the "owner" or "keeper" of a "wild bird" within meaning of Illinois Animal Control Act.

Summary: The Petitioner, the Sierra Club, brought this action for a declaratory judgment and an injunction to restrain federal officials from approving an extensive skiing development in the Mineral King Valley in the Sequoia National Forest. The Sierra Club did not allege that the challenged development would affect the club or its members in their activities, but rather argued that the project would adversely change the area's aesthetics and ecology. The District Court granted a preliminary injunction. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the club lacked standing and had not shown irreparable injury. On grant of certiorari, the Supreme Court held that the Sierra Club, which asserted a only special interest in conservation of natural game refuges and forests, lacked standing under Administrative Procedure Act to maintain the action because it could not demonstrate that its members would be affected in any of their activities or pastimes by the proposed project.

Summary: On July 22, 2003, plaintiff filed suit alleging violations of her constitutional rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, various state common law claims, and violation of the Oregon Property Protection Act (plaintiff's neighbor complained to animal control in May 2001 after hearing the rabbits "screaming and dying"). Plaintiff's claims arise from the seizure of over 400 rabbits from her property, and the subsequent adoption and/or euthanasia of these rabbits. Defendants move for summary judgment on grounds of qualified immunity, failure to allege the proper defendant, and failure to provide notice under the Oregon Tort Claims Act. In granting defendants' motion for summary judgment, the Court found that even if the officers' entry and seizure of plaintiff's property was unlawful, they reasonably believed their actions to be lawful, therefore affording them qualified immunity protection. Further, the court found no taking occurred where the rabbits were euthanized and/or adopted out as part of a initial criminal forfeiture action.

Summary: The court upheld the Secretary’s decision to remove 400 horses from certain public lands in Nevada because of the risks of overgrazing, but also asserted that the Secretary’s discretion was not so complete as to deny judicial review of his actions.

Summary: Plaintiff challenged the constitutionality of the Animal Welfare Act after it created a regulation that prohibited the interstate or foreign commerce transport of birds that would be used in fighting ventures.   She argued that the regulators did not consider whether fighting ventures were legal in the state where the birds were being transported to.   However, the regulation was considered constitutional since under terms of section 2156(b), only the foreign and interstate transport of the birds was prohibited.