Colorado

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CO - Vehicle, animal - § 13-21-108.4. Persons rendering emergency assistance from a locked vehicle

Summary: This Colorado law allows the rescue of animals and "at-risk persons" from locked vehicles under certain conditions. "Animal" defined as cat or dog and specifically excludes livestock. A person is immune from civil or criminal liability for property damage resulting from forcible entry into locked vehicle if all of the following occurs: (1) an animal is present and the person has a reasonable belief that the animal is in imminent danger of death or suffering serious bodily injury; (2) the person determines the vehicle is locked and forcible entry is necessary; (3) the person makes reasonable effort to locate the owner as outlined in the law; (4) the person contacts law enforcement/911/emergency responders prior to forcibly entering vehicle; and he or she remains with vehicle until law enforcement/responders arrive.

This Colorado law allows the rescue of animals and "at-risk persons" from locked vehicles under certain conditions. "Animal" defined as cat or dog and specifically excludes livestock. A person is immune from civil or criminal liability for property damage resulting from forcible entry into locked vehicle if all of the following occurs: (1) an animal is present and the person has a reasonable belief that the animal is in imminent danger of death or suffering serious bodily injury; (2) the person determines the vehicle is locked and forcible entry is necessary; (3) the person makes reasonable effort to locate the owner as outlined in the law; (4) the person contacts law enforcement/911/emergency responders prior to forcibly entering vehicle; and he or she remains with vehicle until law enforcement/responders arrive.

CO - Emergency - § 25-3.5-203. Emergency medical service providers--certification--renewal of certificate--duties of department--rules

Summary: This law concerns emergency medical service providers. An emergency medical service provider may provide preveterinary emergency care to dogs and cats to the extent the provider has received commensurate training and is authorized by the employer to provide the care. Requirements governing the circumstances under which emergency medical service providers may provide preveterinary emergency care to dogs and cats may be specified in the employer's policies governing the provision of care. “Preveterinary emergency care” means the immediate medical stabilization of a dog or cat by an emergency medical service provider, in an emergency to which the emergency medical service provider is responding, through means including oxygen, fluids, medications, or bandaging, with the intent of enabling the dog or cat to be treated by a veterinarian. “Preveterinary emergency care” does not include care provided in response to an emergency call made solely for the purpose of tending to an injured dog or cat, unless a person's life could be in danger attempting to save the life of a dog or cat.

This law concerns emergency medical service providers. An emergency medical service provider may provide preveterinary emergency care to dogs and cats to the extent the provider has received commensurate training and is authorized by the employer to provide the care. Requirements governing the circumstances under which emergency medical service providers may provide preveterinary emergency care to dogs and cats may be specified in the employer's policies governing the provision of care. “Preveterinary emergency care” means the immediate medical stabilization of a dog or cat by an emergency medical service provider, in an emergency to which the emergency medical service provider is responding, through means including oxygen, fluids, medications, or bandaging, with the intent of enabling the dog or cat to be treated by a veterinarian. “Preveterinary emergency care” does not include care provided in response to an emergency call made solely for the purpose of tending to an injured dog or cat, unless a person's life could be in danger attempting to save the life of a dog or cat.

CO - Pet Sales - 8 CCR 1202-15. Rules and Regulations Pertaining to the Pet Animal Care Act

Summary: [Derived from Commissioner of Agriculture statement] The purpose of these rules is to define the administration and enforcement of the Pet Animal Care and Facilities Act, § 35-80-101 through 117, C.R.S., (“PACFA”). The rule includes minimum standards of physical facility, sanitation, ventilation, heating, cooling, humidity, spatial and enclosure requirements, nutrition, humane care, medical treatment, sterilization of dogs and cats released to prospective owners from animal shelters and pet animal rescues, and method of operation, including the minimum holding period for and disposition stray or abandoned pet animals, that are, in the opinion of the Commissioner, necessary to carry out the provisions of this article; the minimum weight requirement for the transfer of cats; maintenance of records concerning health care, euthanasia, and transactions involving pet animals; the establishment of qualifications for any applicant and standards of practice for any of the licenses authorized under this article, including the establishment of classifications and sub-classifications for any license authorized pursuant to PACFA; the issuance and reinstatement of any license authorized by PACFA and the grounds for any disciplinary actions authorized by PACFA, including letters of admonition or the denial, restriction, suspension, or revocation of any license authorized by PACFA; the amount of any license fee for a pet animal facility license; and the annual date on which licenses and psittacine bird leg bands issued pursuant to PACFA expire.

[Derived from Commissioner of Agriculture statement] The purpose of these rules is to define the administration and enforcement of the Pet Animal Care and Facilities Act, § 35-80-101 through 117, C.R.S., (“PACFA”). The rule includes minimum standards of physical facility, sanitation, ventilation, heating, cooling, humidity, spatial and enclosure requirements, nutrition, humane care, medical treatment, sterilization of dogs and cats released to prospective owners from animal shelters and pet animal rescues, and method of operation, including the minimum holding period for and disposition stray or abandoned pet animals, that are, in the opinion of the Commissioner, necessary to carry out the provisions of this article; the minimum weight requirement for the transfer of cats; maintenance of records concerning health care, euthanasia, and transactions involving pet animals; the establishment of qualifications for any applicant and standards of practice for any of the licenses authorized under this article, including the establishment of classifications and sub-classifications for any license authorized pursuant to PACFA; the issuance and reinstatement of any license authorized by PACFA and the grounds for any disciplinary actions authorized by PACFA, including letters of admonition or the denial, restriction, suspension, or revocation of any license authorized by PACFA; the amount of any license fee for a pet animal facility license; and the annual date on which licenses and psittacine bird leg bands issued pursuant to PACFA expire.

CO - Service animal - Article 23. Training Veterans to Train Their Own Service Dogs Pilot Program

Summary: This set of Colorado laws (effective June of 2016) creates a pilot program for veterans to train their own service dogs. The program identifies a group of up to 10 veterans to pair with dogs. Qualified canine trainers will work with the veterans to use train the dogs for use as service dogs. The program will further offer those veterans who graduate from the program with a trained dog the opportunity and necessary follow-along services to expand the program, if willing, by identifying, fostering, and training a subsequent dog for another eligible veteran who is unable to complete one or more parts of the process due to physical limitations. Other sections of the article explain the criteria for selecting the non-profit agencies for implementation and the creation of a fund in the state treasury.

This set of Colorado laws (effective June of 2016) creates a pilot program for veterans to train their own service dogs. The program identifies a group of up to 10 veterans to pair with dogs. Qualified canine trainers will work with the veterans to use train the dogs for use as service dogs. The program will further offer those veterans who graduate from the program with a trained dog the opportunity and necessary follow-along services to expand the program, if willing, by identifying, fostering, and training a subsequent dog for another eligible veteran who is unable to complete one or more parts of the process due to physical limitations. Other sections of the article explain the criteria for selecting the non-profit agencies for implementation and the creation of a fund in the state treasury.

People v. Harris

Summary: Harris was convicted for twenty-two counts of cruelty to animals after dozens of malnourished animals were found on her property by employees of the Humane Society. On appeal, Harris raised two main issues: (1) that the animal protection agent who was an employee of the Humane Society was not authorized to obtain a search warrant to investigate her property and (2) that the mistreatment of the twenty-two animals constituted one continuous course of conduct and that the lower court violated her rights under the Double Jeopardy Clause by entering a judgment on twenty-two counts of animal cruelty. The Court of Appeals reviewed the issue of whether the animal protection agent had the authority to obtain a search warrant to investigate the property and determined that the agent did not have the proper authority. The Court looked to the state statute that specifically stated that only “state employees” were able to investigate livestock cases. In this case, the animal protection agent was employed by the Humane Society and was not a state employee; therefore, he did not have the authority to obtain a search warrant to investigate the property. However, the Court found that there was no constitutional violation with regard to the search warrant because it was still obtained based on probable cause. For this reason, the Court denied Harris’ request to suppress evidence that was submitted as a result of the search warrant. Finally, the Court reviewed Harris’ argument regarding her rights under the Double Jeopardy Clause. The Court found that under the statute dealing with animal cruelty, the phrases “any animal” and “an animal” suggests that a person commits a separate offense for each animal that is mistreated. Essentially, the Court held that the language of the statute “demonstrates that the legislature perceived animal cruelty not as an offense against property but as an offense against the individual animal.” As a result, Harris’ rights under the Double Jeopardy Clause were not violated and the Court upheld the lower court’s decision.

Harris was convicted for twenty-two counts of cruelty to animals after dozens of malnourished animals were found on her property by employees of the Humane Society. On appeal, Harris raised two main issues: (1) that the animal protection agent who was an employee of the Humane Society was not authorized to obtain a search warrant to investigate her property and (2) that the mistreatment of the twenty-two animals constituted one continuous course of conduct and that the lower court violated her rights under the Double Jeopardy Clause by entering a judgment on twenty-two counts of animal cruelty. The Court of Appeals reviewed the issue of whether the animal protection agent had the authority to obtain a search warrant to investigate the property and determined that the agent did not have the proper authority. The Court looked to the state statute that specifically stated that only “state employees” were able to investigate livestock cases. In this case, the animal protection agent was employed by the Humane Society and was not a state employee; therefore, he did not have the authority to obtain a search warrant to investigate the property. However, the Court found that there was no constitutional violation with regard to the search warrant because it was still obtained based on probable cause. For this reason, the Court denied Harris’ request to suppress evidence that was submitted as a result of the search warrant. Finally, the Court reviewed Harris’ argument regarding her rights under the Double Jeopardy Clause. The Court found that under the statute dealing with animal cruelty, the phrases “any animal” and “an animal” suggests that a person commits a separate offense for each animal that is mistreated. Essentially, the Court held that the language of the statute “demonstrates that the legislature perceived animal cruelty not as an offense against property but as an offense against the individual animal.” As a result, Harris’ rights under the Double Jeopardy Clause were not violated and the Court upheld the lower court’s decision.

Hartlee v. Hardey

Summary: Plaintiffs filed suit against a veterinarian and a number of police officers who were involved in their prosecution of animal cruelty. Plaintiffs Switf and Hatlee worked together on a Echo Valley Ranch where they provided care and boarding for horses. In February 2012, Officer Smith went to Echo Valley Ranch to conduct a welfare check on the horses. Officer Smith noticed that the horses seemed to be in poor condition, so he requested that a veternarian visis the ranch to inspect the horses. Dr. Olds, a local veterinarian, visited the ranch and wrote a report that suggested that the horses be seized due to their current state. Officer Smith initially served plaintiffs with a warning but after returning to the ranch and noticing that the horses’ condition had worsened, the horses were seized and plaintiffs were charged with animal cruelty. In this case, plaintiffs argued that the veterinarian had wrote the medical report for a “publicity stunt” and that this report influenced Officer’s Smith’s decision to seize the horses and charge plaintiffs with animal cruelty. The court ultimately found that the veterinarian’s report was not made as a “publicity stunt,” especially due to the fact that the report was filed privately and not made available to the public. Also, the court found that there was no evidence to suggest that the veterinarian and the officers were working with one another in a “conspiracy” to seize the horses and charge plaintiffs with animal cruelty.

Plaintiffs filed suit against a veterinarian and a number of police officers who were involved in their prosecution of animal cruelty. Plaintiffs Switf and Hatlee worked together on a Echo Valley Ranch where they provided care and boarding for horses. In February 2012, Officer Smith went to Echo Valley Ranch to conduct a welfare check on the horses. Officer Smith noticed that the horses seemed to be in poor condition, so he requested that a veternarian visis the ranch to inspect the horses. Dr. Olds, a local veterinarian, visited the ranch and wrote a report that suggested that the horses be seized due to their current state. Officer Smith initially served plaintiffs with a warning but after returning to the ranch and noticing that the horses’ condition had worsened, the horses were seized and plaintiffs were charged with animal cruelty. In this case, plaintiffs argued that the veterinarian had wrote the medical report for a “publicity stunt” and that this report influenced Officer’s Smith’s decision to seize the horses and charge plaintiffs with animal cruelty. The court ultimately found that the veterinarian’s report was not made as a “publicity stunt,” especially due to the fact that the report was filed privately and not made available to the public. Also, the court found that there was no evidence to suggest that the veterinarian and the officers were working with one another in a “conspiracy” to seize the horses and charge plaintiffs with animal cruelty.

Salazar v. Kubic

Summary: At her facility, Defendant raised and housed more than 200 mice and rats to be sold as feed for snakes and other carnivores. Until March 2013, Defendant had a valid license issued under Pet Animal Care and Facilities Act (PACFA), but it expired. Upon the expiration Defendant kept operating her facility despite a cease and desist order from the Colorado Commissioner of Agriculture. The trial court granted the Commissioner's request for a permanent injunction to prevent Defendant from operating without the required PACFA license and from violating the cease and desist order. On appeal, the court rejected Defendant’s argument that her rodents were outside PACFA’s “pet animal” definition, despite the fact the mice and rats she sold were used as food, not household pets. Additionally, the court found rats and mice did not fit within the statutory exemptions for livestock or “any other animal designated by the Commissioner.” The court was also unpersuaded that Defendants rodents were “working animals” because there was no indication that she used them to perform any function that could be considered “work.” The district court’s decision was affirmed.

At her facility, Defendant raised and housed more than 200 mice and rats to be sold as feed for snakes and other carnivores. Until March 2013, Defendant had a valid license issued under Pet Animal Care and Facilities Act (PACFA), but it expired. Upon the expiration Defendant kept operating her facility despite a cease and desist order from the Colorado Commissioner of Agriculture. The trial court granted the Commissioner's request for a permanent injunction to prevent Defendant from operating without the required PACFA license and from violating the cease and desist order. On appeal, the court rejected Defendant’s argument that her rodents were outside PACFA’s “pet animal” definition, despite the fact the mice and rats she sold were used as food, not household pets. Additionally, the court found rats and mice did not fit within the statutory exemptions for livestock or “any other animal designated by the Commissioner.” The court was also unpersuaded that Defendants rodents were “working animals” because there was no indication that she used them to perform any function that could be considered “work.” The district court’s decision was affirmed.

Roalstad v. City of Lafayette

Summary: The origins of this matter began when the City of Lafayette (City) charged Defendant/Appellant with violating its municipal ordinance regarding vicious animals. Defendant/Appellant requested a jury trial pursuant to C.R.S.A. § 16-10-109. The municipal court denied the request. Defendant/Appellant appealed the district court's dismissal of her C.R.C.P. 106 and declaratory judgment action in which she challenged the municipal court's denial of her request for a jury trial. The sole issue on appeal was whether the offense for which Defendant was charged under the City's ordinances was a “petty offense” under C.R.S.A. § 16-10-109, which would entitle her to a jury trial under that statute. Since the municipal ordinance imposed fines that met that definition and because it was not a crime at common law, the court concluded the offense met the definition of “petty offense;” Defendant/Appellant was therefore entitled to a jury trial in municipal court pursuant to C.R.S.A. § 16-10-109. Further, because the ordinance and the state Dangerous Dog law were counterparts and because the ordinance was criminal in nature, the vicious animal offense was not exempt from the “petty offense” definition. Accordingly, the district court’s order was reversed.

The origins of this matter began when the City of Lafayette (City) charged Defendant/Appellant with violating its municipal ordinance regarding vicious animals. Defendant/Appellant requested a jury trial pursuant to C.R.S.A. § 16-10-109. The municipal court denied the request. Defendant/Appellant appealed the district court's dismissal of her C.R.C.P. 106 and declaratory judgment action in which she challenged the municipal court's denial of her request for a jury trial. The sole issue on appeal was whether the offense for which Defendant was charged under the City's ordinances was a “petty offense” under C.R.S.A. § 16-10-109, which would entitle her to a jury trial under that statute. Since the municipal ordinance imposed fines that met that definition and because it was not a crime at common law, the court concluded the offense met the definition of “petty offense;” Defendant/Appellant was therefore entitled to a jury trial in municipal court pursuant to C.R.S.A. § 16-10-109. Further, because the ordinance and the state Dangerous Dog law were counterparts and because the ordinance was criminal in nature, the vicious animal offense was not exempt from the “petty offense” definition. Accordingly, the district court’s order was reversed.

CO - Lien, veterinary - Part 1. Lien on Personal Property.

Summary: These Colorado laws concern liens on pet animals for persons who are entrusted with caring for the animals. Under 38-20-102, any feeder, veterinarian, or other person entrusted with the pet for feeding, keeping, boarding, or medical shall have a lien for the amount of costs incurred in the care of the animal. Any contracts (or copies thereof) made by the owner of the pet animal with the person caring for the animals may be filed with the county clerk where the owner resides (or where the contract was made for non-residents). The filing of this contract constitutes notice to the contents of the contract and the legal effect of the filing.

These Colorado laws concern liens on pet animals for persons who are entrusted with caring for the animals. Under 38-20-102, any feeder, veterinarian, or other person entrusted with the pet for feeding, keeping, boarding, or medical shall have a lien for the amount of costs incurred in the care of the animal. Any contracts (or copies thereof) made by the owner of the pet animal with the person caring for the animals may be filed with the county clerk where the owner resides (or where the contract was made for non-residents). The filing of this contract constitutes notice to the contents of the contract and the legal effect of the filing.

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