Mississippi

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MS - Facility, courtroom dog - § 99-43-101. Child witness standards of protection

Summary: Under Mississippi law, in any proceeding in which a child testifies, a child shall have the right to be enforced by the court on its own motion by an attorney in the proceeding to permit a properly trained facility animal or comfort item or both to be present inside the courtroom or hearing room.

Under Mississippi law, in any proceeding in which a child testifies, a child shall have the right to be enforced by the court on its own motion by an attorney in the proceeding to permit a properly trained facility animal or comfort item or both to be present inside the courtroom or hearing room.

MS - Dog, police - § 41-59-35. Duration of EMT certificate; transport of injured police dog;

Summary: This law covers certification of emergency medical technicians. In 2018, the law was amended to allow an EMT, EMT-A, EMR, or Paramedic to transport a police dog injured in the line of duty to a veterinary clinic, hospital emergency department or similar facility if there are no persons requiring medical attention or transport at that time. Under this subsection, “police dog” means a dog owned or used by a law enforcement department or agency in the course of the department or agency's work, including a search and rescue dog, service dog, accelerant detection canine, or other dog that is in use by a county, municipal, or state law enforcement agency.

This law covers certification of emergency medical technicians. In 2018, the law was amended to allow an EMT, EMT-A, EMR, or Paramedic to transport a police dog injured in the line of duty to a veterinary clinic, hospital emergency department or similar facility if there are no persons requiring medical attention or transport at that time. Under this subsection, “police dog” means a dog owned or used by a law enforcement department or agency in the course of the department or agency's work, including a search and rescue dog, service dog, accelerant detection canine, or other dog that is in use by a county, municipal, or state law enforcement agency.

Hatfield v. Bd. of Supervisors of Madison Cty.

Summary: This Mississippi Supreme Court decision considers the construction of a zoning ordinance that prohibits the "keeping or raising poultry" in the "R-1 Residential District" of Madison County. The property owner, Hatfield, was found to be violating R-1 by the Madison County Board of Supervisors after county officials found around 60 "ducks, geese and other fowl" on this property. Hatfield appealed this decision to the Circuit Court as arbitrary and capricious based on an unconstitutionally vague ordinance section. The Circuit Court, as the reviewing appellate body for the ordinance violation, found the Board's decision was supported by evidence and not arbitrary or capricious. On appeal by Hatfield, the Supreme Court first observed that there are two districts in appellant's subdivision: Agricultural and Residential. In the Agricultural Districts, breeding, raising, and feeding fowl is an expressly permitted use. Appellant lives the zoned Residential Estate District. While the R-1 zoning allows "livestock" and "grazing livestock" on tracts of land one acre or greater, it does not allow the breeding, raising, and feeding chickens, ducks, or other fowl as a permitted use. Hatfield suggested that grazing/livestock section (Section 601) could be interpreted to include poultry, fowl, and/or birds. However, the Supreme Court found that position unreasonable since the examples listed in the code section are "obviously limited to large, four-legged, hoofed animals." This is further supported by the fact raising fowl is expressly permitted in one district, but not the other. Thus, the Ordinance was sufficiently clear and not manifestly unreasonable. The circuit court's decision was affirmed.

This Mississippi Supreme Court decision considers the construction of a zoning ordinance that prohibits the "keeping or raising poultry" in the "R-1 Residential District" of Madison County. The property owner, Hatfield, was found to be violating R-1 by the Madison County Board of Supervisors after county officials found around 60 "ducks, geese and other fowl" on this property. Hatfield appealed this decision to the Circuit Court as arbitrary and capricious based on an unconstitutionally vague ordinance section. The Circuit Court, as the reviewing appellate body for the ordinance violation, found the Board's decision was supported by evidence and not arbitrary or capricious. On appeal by Hatfield, the Supreme Court first observed that there are two districts in appellant's subdivision: Agricultural and Residential. In the Agricultural Districts, breeding, raising, and feeding fowl is an expressly permitted use. Appellant lives the zoned Residential Estate District. While the R-1 zoning allows "livestock" and "grazing livestock" on tracts of land one acre or greater, it does not allow the breeding, raising, and feeding chickens, ducks, or other fowl as a permitted use. Hatfield suggested that grazing/livestock section (Section 601) could be interpreted to include poultry, fowl, and/or birds. However, the Supreme Court found that position unreasonable since the examples listed in the code section are "obviously limited to large, four-legged, hoofed animals." This is further supported by the fact raising fowl is expressly permitted in one district, but not the other. Thus, the Ordinance was sufficiently clear and not manifestly unreasonable. The circuit court's decision was affirmed.

MS - Theft - § 97-17-61. Taking of animals or vehicles

Summary: This Mississippi statute provides that any person who takes away any livestock animal, dog, or vehicle without the consent of the owner or his or her agent, where such taking and carrying away does not amount to larceny, shall be fined, imprisoned, or both upon conviction. This statute does not apply to anyone who takes property of another believing, in good faith, that he or she has a right to do so.

This Mississippi statute provides that any person who takes away any livestock animal, dog, or vehicle without the consent of the owner or his or her agent, where such taking and carrying away does not amount to larceny, shall be fined, imprisoned, or both upon conviction. This statute does not apply to anyone who takes property of another believing, in good faith, that he or she has a right to do so.

MS - Dog Theft - Chapter 17. Crimes Against Property

Summary: This Mississippi Statute provides that a person commits a felonious offense by stealing, taking and carrying away any dog that is the property of another. If the person who commits the offense is indicted and convicted for stealing the dog, he or she shall be punished by a fine not more than $500, imprisonment not more than 6 months, or both, or imprisoned in the penitentiary not less than 1 year nor more than 2 years.

This Mississippi Statute provides that a person commits a felonious offense by stealing, taking and carrying away any dog that is the property of another. If the person who commits the offense is indicted and convicted for stealing the dog, he or she shall be punished by a fine not more than $500, imprisonment not more than 6 months, or both, or imprisoned in the penitentiary not less than 1 year nor more than 2 years.

MS - Trust - § 91-8-408. Trust for care of animal

Summary: This Mississippi statute allows a trust to be created to provide for the care of an animal alive during the settlor's lifetime. The trust terminates upon the death of the animal or, if the trust was created to provide for the care of more than one (1) animal alive during the settlor's lifetime, upon the death of the last surviving animal.

This Mississippi statute allows a trust to be created to provide for the care of an animal alive during the settlor's lifetime. The trust terminates upon the death of the animal or, if the trust was created to provide for the care of more than one (1) animal alive during the settlor's lifetime, upon the death of the last surviving animal.

Olier v. Bailey

Summary: Plaintiff was attacked and chased by a domestic goose in Defendant’s yard. As Plaintiff attempted to flee, she fell and broke her arm. Plaintiff sued Defendant in the County Court of Jackson County under a theory of premises liability and, alternatively, under the dangerous-propensity rule. The trial court granted summary judgment because it found that Plaintiff was a licensee on Defendant's property and that Defendant did not breach her duty of care toward Plaintiff. It also denied relief under the dangerous-propensity rule because there was no evidence that the particular goose that bit Plaintiff ever had exhibited dangerous propensities prior to the incident. Plaintiff appealed to the Jackson County Circuit Court, which affirmed. Plaintiff then filed the instant appeal. The Supreme Court of Mississippi held that, while Plaintiff cannot, as a matter of law, pursue her claim under her theory of general premises liability, she can proceed under the dangerous-propensity theory because the court found an issue of fact regarding whether Defendant was on notice of her geese's alleged dangerous propensity. Accordingly, the Supreme Court affirmed the trial court judgment in part, reversed it in part, and remanded for further proceedings.

Plaintiff was attacked and chased by a domestic goose in Defendant’s yard. As Plaintiff attempted to flee, she fell and broke her arm. Plaintiff sued Defendant in the County Court of Jackson County under a theory of premises liability and, alternatively, under the dangerous-propensity rule. The trial court granted summary judgment because it found that Plaintiff was a licensee on Defendant's property and that Defendant did not breach her duty of care toward Plaintiff. It also denied relief under the dangerous-propensity rule because there was no evidence that the particular goose that bit Plaintiff ever had exhibited dangerous propensities prior to the incident. Plaintiff appealed to the Jackson County Circuit Court, which affirmed. Plaintiff then filed the instant appeal. The Supreme Court of Mississippi held that, while Plaintiff cannot, as a matter of law, pursue her claim under her theory of general premises liability, she can proceed under the dangerous-propensity theory because the court found an issue of fact regarding whether Defendant was on notice of her geese's alleged dangerous propensity. Accordingly, the Supreme Court affirmed the trial court judgment in part, reversed it in part, and remanded for further proceedings.

Detailed Discussion of Mississippi Great Ape Laws

Summary: The following article discusses Great Apes law in Mississippi. Mississippi law directly regulates Great Apes by a law that bans the importation and possession of certain wild animals deemed "inherently dangerous." In addition, the state also addresses Great Apes in its general anti-cruelty law as well as its endangered species provisions.

The following article discusses Great Apes law in Mississippi. Mississippi law directly regulates Great Apes by a law that bans the importation and possession of certain wild animals deemed "inherently dangerous." In addition, the state also addresses Great Apes in its general anti-cruelty law as well as its endangered species provisions.

Shotts v. City of Madison

Summary: Defendant was charged with animal cruelty after burning his girlfriend's dog while giving it a bath. He said it was an accident. There were no other witnesses, and the attending veterinarian testified that the dog's injuries were consistent with defendant's account. Defendant was nevertheless convicted after the county court suggested he could be guilty of animal cruelty if he had “carelessly” hurt the dog. Instead, the appeals court found the lower court applied the wrong legal standard. The 2011 animal cruelty statute, since repealed, that applied in this case required proof beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant acted maliciously. Since the prosecution failed to meet that burden, the Mississippi Court of Appeals reversed and rendered the defendant's conviction. Justice James dissents finding that there was sufficient evidence to support the conviction.

Defendant was charged with animal cruelty after burning his girlfriend's dog while giving it a bath. He said it was an accident. There were no other witnesses, and the attending veterinarian testified that the dog's injuries were consistent with defendant's account. Defendant was nevertheless convicted after the county court suggested he could be guilty of animal cruelty if he had “carelessly” hurt the dog. Instead, the appeals court found the lower court applied the wrong legal standard. The 2011 animal cruelty statute, since repealed, that applied in this case required proof beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant acted maliciously. Since the prosecution failed to meet that burden, the Mississippi Court of Appeals reversed and rendered the defendant's conviction. Justice James dissents finding that there was sufficient evidence to support the conviction.

MS - Initiatives - HCR 30, Establish the Right to Hunt, Fish and Harvest Wildlife as a Constitutional Right

Summary: This 2014 proposed legislative referendum would establish the right to hunt and fish in the state. "Section 12A. The people have the right to hunt, fish and harvest wildlife, including by the use of traditional methods, subject only to laws and regulations that promote wildlife conservation and management and that preserve the future of hunting and fishing, as the Legislature may prescribe by general law. Public hunting and fishing shall be a preferred means of managing and controlling wildlife. This section may not be construed to modify any provision of law relating to trespass, property rights, the regulation of commercial activities or the maintenance of levees pursuant to Article 11."

This 2014 proposed legislative referendum would establish the right to hunt and fish in the state. "Section 12A. The people have the right to hunt, fish and harvest wildlife, including by the use of traditional methods, subject only to laws and regulations that promote wildlife conservation and management and that preserve the future of hunting and fishing, as the Legislature may prescribe by general law. Public hunting and fishing shall be a preferred means of managing and controlling wildlife. This section may not be construed to modify any provision of law relating to trespass, property rights, the regulation of commercial activities or the maintenance of levees pursuant to Article 11."
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