United States

Summary: This Rhode Island law, enacted in 2016, states that a restaurant with an outdoor dining area may allow a patron's dog to accompany the patron in the outdoor dining area during the hours designated by the owner of the restaurant. The owner may establish limits on the size and types of dogs in addition to other restrictions. The patron visiting the restaurant must not allow the dog to travel through the indoor space of the restaurant and must keep the dog leashed and supervised at all times. There must be an adult responsible for the behavior of the dog and that person is liable for any damages to the restaurant or other patrons.

Summary: This Indiana law states that a hunting preserve may not allow computer assisted hunting.

Summary: This Connecticut law states that no person shall operate, provide, sell, use or offer to operate, provide, sell or use any computer software or service that allows a person, when not physically present, to remotely control a firearm or weapon to hunt a live animal or bird. Violation is a class A misdemeanor.

Summary: This Iowa law prohibits “remote control or internet hunting." This involves the acts of offering such services for sale as well as taking, or assisting in the take of a wild animal kept on a hunting preserve by remote control or internet hunting. A person who violates this section is guilty of a serious misdemeanor. A second or subsequent violation of this section is punishable as a class “D” felony.

Summary: Under this Louisiana law, it is unlawful for lawful for horses, mules, donkeys, or asses to go on the paved, black-topped and asphalt treated highways of the state.

Summary: In Zuchtvieh-Export GmbH v. Stadt Kempten, the European Court of Justice ruled that a European Council regulation that protects animal welfare during transport applies to the stages of a journey outside of the European Union (EU), if that journey commenced within the EU. This ruling by the European Court of Justice has been praised as it improves animal transport conditions outside of the EU. However, transport companies and governments outside of the EU are less welcoming of the ruling. The ruling highlights the difficulty in determining when and how such a regulation should be applied abroad. It also raises the broader question of striking a balance between efficient and uniform regulation across borders and maintaining territorial sovereignty. As a solution to the issues raised in Zuchtvieh-Export, this Comment suggests the use of bilateral international agreements, which would reduce conflict between nations by protecting territorial sovereignty.

Summary: This FAQ explores the few states that address dogs or other animals riding unsecured in the back of pickup trucks.

Summary: Defendant appealed a trial court determination that his dog was dangerous under Ohio law. The designation stemmed from an incident in 2015, where defendant's dog and another dog began to fight. A neighbor attempted to break up the fight and was subsequently bitten on the hand. A week after that incident, the local deputy dog warden gave the defendant notice that there was cause to believe his dog was dangerous due to the bite on the hand. The magistrate found the dog did not meet the statutory definition of a dangerous dog. Animal control then appealed the magistrate's decision and the trial court agreed, finding that animal control demonstrated by clear and convincing evidence that the dog was dangerous. At the Court of Appeals, Pflaum argued that the trial court abused its discretion in overturning the magistrate's decision. The court observed that the neighbor's striking of the Pflaum's dog during the fight fell within the concept of "torment" for purposes of determining provocation. While the neighbor's action were "well-intentioned," the issue of whether a person "tormented" a dog does not depend on whether there was a malicious intent. Thus, there was not clear and convincing evidence that the dog acted without provocation when it caused injury to a person. The trial court was reversed and the cause remanded.

Summary: Kaporos is a customary Jewish ritual which entails grasping a live chicken and swinging the bird three times overhead while saying a prayer. Upon completion of the prayer, the chicken's throat is slit and its meat is donated. The practice takes place outdoors, on public streets in Brooklyn. The Plaintiffs include the Alliance to End Chickens as Kaporos and individual Plaintiffs who reside, work or travel, within Brooklyn neighborhoods. The Defendants included City defendants such as the New York City Police Department and non-City defendants such as individual Orthodox Jewish rabbis. The Plaintiffs alleged that Kaporos is a health hazard and cruel to animals. Plaintiffs requested the remedy of mandamus to compel the City Defendants to enforce certain laws related to preserving public health and preventing animal cruelty. The Supreme Court, Appellate Division, First Department, New York affirmed the Supreme Court's dismissal of the proceedings against the City defendants. The Court reasoned that none of the laws or regulations that the Plaintiffs relied on precluded the City Defendants from deciding whether or not to engage in Kaporos. Also, the Plaintiffs did not have a “clear legal right” to dictate which laws are enforced, how, or against whom. The Court stated that determining which laws and regulations might be properly enforced against the non-City defendants without infringing upon their free exercise of religion could not be dictated by the court through mandamus.

Summary: The Petitioners, including the Nonhuman Rights Project, Inc . filed two petitions for habeas corpus relief on behalf of Tommy and Kiko, two adult male chimpanzees. The petitions stated that chimpanzees are intelligent, have the ability to be trained by humans to be obedient to rules, and to fulfill certain duties and responsibilities. Therefore, chimpanzees should be afforded some of the same fundamental rights as humans which include entitlement to habeas relief. The Respondents, included Tommy’s owners, Circle L Trailer Sales, Inc. and its officers, as well as Kiko’s owners, the Primate Sanctuary, Inc. and its officers and directors. The Supreme Court, New York County, declined to extend habeas corpus relief to the chimpanzees. The Petitioners appealed. The Supreme Court, Appellate Division affirmed and held that:(1) the petitions were successive habeas proceedings which were not warranted or supported by any changed circumstances; (2) human-like characteristics of chimpanzees did not render them “persons” for purposes of habeas corpus relief; and (3) even if habeas relief was potentially available to chimpanzees, writ of habeas corpus did not lie on behalf of two chimpanzees at issue.