United States

Summary: Plaintiffs bring this action against Goldmark Property Management alleging discrimination on the basis of disability in violation of the Fair Housing Act. The alleged discriminatory policy is a mandatory application fee, non-refundable deposit, and monthly charge that Goldmark imposes on tenants with disabilities who reside with a non-specially trained assistance animal (i.e. a companion pet). These same fees are waived for tenants with disabilities who reside with a trained assistance animal (i.e. a seeing eye dog). The FHA encompasses all types of assistance animals regardless of training; therefore, Goldmark's policy implicates the FHA. Further, Plaintiffs have met their burden of establishing a prima face case of discrimination and have presented sufficient evidence to create genuine issues for trial on the questions of the necessity and reasonableness of the requested accommodation and whether Goldmark's alleged objective for the policy is permissible under the FHA and not pretextual. Therefore, Goldmark's motion for summary judgment is granted in part and denied in part. It is granted as to Plaintiffs' claim of disparate treatment because no proof was offered of a discriminatory intent. It is denied as to Plaintiffs' claims of disparate impact and failure to make a reasonable accommodation.

Summary: In its motion for summary judgment, Defendant argues Plaintiff’s accommodation request under the Federal Fair Housing Act (the “FHA”) to modify Defendant's “no pet” policy was unreasonable because Plaintiff's emotional support animal was a pit bull and pit bulls were banned by county ordinance. In denying the Defendant’s motion, the District Court found that changing a no pets policy for an emotional support animal was a reasonable accommodation under the FHA. The court also found that enforcing the county ordinance would violate the FHA by permitting a discriminatory housing practice. However, in line with US Department of Housing and Urban Development notices, the court found genuine issues of material fact remained as to whether the dog posed a direct threat to members of the condominium association, and whether that threat could be reduced by other reasonable accommodations.

Summary: Plaintiffs sought damages stemming from Defendants' refusal to accommodate Plaintiffs’ minor son's mental health disabilities by allowing Plaintiffs to keep a mixed-breed pit bull as an emotional support animal in their rented duplex. Plaintiffs asserted (1) housing discrimination under the Federal Housing Act (“FHA”), (2) unlawful retaliation under the FHA, (3) discrimination under the Texas Fair Housing Act (“TFHA”), and (4) unlawful retaliation under § 92.331 of the Texas Property Code. Defendants filed the Motion, seeking dismissal of the Complaint pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6). The court found Plaintiffs had adequately pleaded all claims and denied the Defendant’s motion to dismiss.

Summary: This case stems from a dispute between Plaintiff/Appellant and the city of Blue Ash (City) on whether Plaintiff/Appellant could keep a miniature horse at her house as a service animal for her disabled minor daughter. Plaintiff/Appellant’s daughter suffers from a number of disabilities that affect her ability to walk and balance independently, and the horse enabled her to play and get exercise in her backyard without assistance from an adult. In 2013, the City passed a municipal ordinance banning horses from residential property and then criminally prosecuted plaintiff/appellant for violating it. Plaintiff/Appellant’s defense was that the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”), and the Fair Housing Amendments Act (“FHAA”), both entitled her to keep the horse at her house as a service animal for her daughter. Rejecting those arguments, the Hamilton County Municipal Court found Plaintiff/Appellant guilty. Plaintiff/Appellant filed suit in federal court arguing that the ADA and FHAA entitled her to keep her horse as a service animal. The district court granted summary judgment to the City, finding that Plaintiff/Appellant's claims were barred by claim and issue preclusion stemming from her Municipal Court conviction. On appeal, the Sixth Circuit found that, because the fact-finding procedures available in a criminal proceeding in municipal court differed substantially from those available in a civil proceeding, Plaintiff/Appellant's conviction had no preclusive effect on this lawsuit. Furthermore, while there was no evidence that the City's actions were motivated by discriminatory intent against the minor daughter or had a disparate impact on disabled individuals, there were significant factual disputes regarding whether the ADA or FHAA required the City to permit Plaintiff/Appellant to keep her miniature horse at her house. The district court's grant of summary judgment to the City on those claims was therefore reversed.

Summary: This notice explains certain obligations of housing providers under the Fair Housing Act (FHAct), Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (Section 504), and the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) with respect to animals that provide assistance to individuals with disabilities. The Department of Justice's (DOT) amendments to its regulations' for Titles II and III of the ADA limit the definition of "service animal” under the ADA to include only dogs, and further define "service animal" to exclude emotional support animals. This definition, however, does not limit housing providers' obligations to make reasonable accommodations for assistance animals under the FHAct or Section 504. Persons with disabilities may request a reasonable accommodation for any assistance animal, including an emotional support animal, under both the FHAct and Section 504.

Summary: The purpose of this Note is to investigate this clash and analyze the constitutionality of the five Ag-Gag statutes that specifically target surreptitious investigative techniques. Part I provides an overview of these state Ag-Gag statutes enacted around the United States. Part II summarizes the first constitutional challenge to an Ag-Gag statute - Animal Legal Def. Fund v. Hebert, which is pending in the U.S. District Court for the District of Utah. Part III analyzes the constitutionality of the provisions of Ag-Gag statutes that (a) provide a cause of action for civil restitution for the actual and consequential damages resulting from a violation of the statutes; or (b) implicate third parties by triggering state criminal laws such as aiding and abetting or conspiracy. Finally, Part IV summarizes the author's conclusions about the extent to which the First Amendment shields journalists and newsgathering organizations from prosecution under an Ag-Gag statute.

Summary: Managing endangered species in captivity presents a unique set of problems. Despite their enormous potential to preserve species in the wild - through captive breeding programs, conservation initiatives, and environmental advocacy - many facilities are lagging behind. Part II of this note discusses the evolution of zoos from ancient Egyptian displays of wealth to modern day conservation and education centers. Focusing on the Endangered Species Act, Part III introduces various laws protecting captive animals. Part IV discusses the great potential of zoos to preserve species and the ecosystems on which they rely, while acknowledging the diverse nature of animal exhibitors and the variety in quality of animal care. In response to this inconsistency, and in the context of PETA v. U.S. Fish & Wildlife Service,5 Part V recommends four factors that the FWS might use to evaluate an animal exhibitor's potential to enhance species survival in furtherance of the ESA.

Summary: Under the Herptiles-Herps Act reptiles and amphibians are exempt from the definition of “aquatic life” under the Fish and Aquatic Life Code. All rules and enforcement actions under the Illinois Conservation Law and the dangerous animals statutes related to reptiles and amphibians are now covered exclusively by this Act.

Summary: This Note argues that a near-complete ban in ivory trade not only raises difficult domestic legal issues, but also does little to stop elephant poaching in Africa. Further, enacting a similar ban in China is not only unrealistic, but also would increase the illegal trade and, therefore, the slaughter of elephants in Africa. Part I explains the history of illegal ivory trade and describes the current legal environments in the United States and China. Part II presents the domestic legal and policy implications of an ivory ban, and analyzes the potential difficulties with implementing a similar ban in China. Part III argues that while the United States should stringently regulate the domestic ivory market, a near-complete ban is unreasonable. Further, a similar ban in China is not a practical solution; Chinese officials must consider strategies to optimize existing laws and gain public support.